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Abstract
A quantum version of the Matching Pennies (MP) game is proposed that is played using
an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm (EPR-Bohm) setting. We construct the quantum game
without using the state vectors, while considering only the quantum mechanical joint proba-
bilities relevant to the EPR-Bohm setting. We embed the classical game within the quantum
game such that the classical MP game results when the quantum mechanical joint prob-
abilities become factorizable. We report new Nash equilibria in the quantum MP game
that emerge when the quantum mechanical joint probabilities maximally violate the Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt form of Bell’s inequality.
Keywords: quantum games, Nash equilibrium, EPR-Bohm experiment, quantum probability
1 Introduction
A classical game [1, 2] can be considered an abstract mathematical entity that is connected to
the physical world [3] in at least three recognizable ways: a) it describes a strategic interaction
among the participating players b) it is implemented using a classical physical system that the
players share to play the game c) it is played in the presence of a referee who ensures that the
participating players abide by its rules.
Quantum games [4]- [39] retain a) and c) but they are distinguished from the classical games
in that the physical system used in the implementation of the game is quantum mechanical.
This naturally gives rise to the central question for the area of quantum games: How quantum
mechanical features of the shared physical system, used in the physical implementation of the
game, express themselves in terms of the outcome/solution of the game?
For a faithful answer to this question it seems natural to establish, as the first step, a cor-
respondence between the classical features, or classicality, of the shared physical system and the
classical game and its particular outcome. Establishing this correspondence paves the way for the
next step asking what impact it will have on the outcome/solution of the game as the classical
features of the shared physical system are replaced by quantum features.
The physical system used in a two-party Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm (EPR-Bohm) exper-
iment [40–47, 49, 50] is known to have genuinely quantum features. This naturally motivates the
use of a two-party EPR-Bohm physical system to play a two-player quantum game.
Motivated by developing this approach towards quantum games, we proposed in Ref. [37] a
scheme to play quantum games using EPR-Bohm experiment. We reported that this scheme is
able to construct genuine quantum games from quantum mechanical probabilities only [54]. This is
accomplished in the proposed scheme without referring to the quantum mechanical state vectors,
and with little reliance on the mathematical tools of quantum mechanics.
We proposed this scheme for quantum games in view of Jarrett’s position [53] stating that
the experimentally observed violations of Bell inequalities in EPR-Bohm experiments are due to
violations of the conjunction of two probabilistic constraints—locality and completeness. Jarrett
concluded [53] that “the predictions of quantum mechanics, in good agreement with the experi-
mental results, satisfy locality, but violate completeness.” Winsberg and Fine [49, 50] prefer the
wording factorizability for Jarrett’s completeness. We adopted Winsberg and Fine’s terminol-
ogy in Ref. [37] as well as in this present paper. That is, the quantum features of EPR-Bohm
experiments emerge for non-factorizable joint probabilities.
By constructing quantum games from unusual non-factorizable joint probabilities this scheme
provides a unifying perspective for both quantum and classical games, and also presents a more
easily accessible analysis of quantum games for researchers working outside the domain of quantum
physics.
This scheme was developed for quantum games [37] and applied it to analyze the games [2] of
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Stag Hunt, and Chicken. For the PD game our analysis showed that,
contrary to the widely held belief, no new solution that is different from the classical solution
emerges when a quantum version of this game is constructed using an EPR-Bohm setting.
However, within the same setting, for three-player PD [38, 39] a new solution indeed emerges
that is also found to be Pareto-optimal [2]. Moreover, we showed that for the two-player quantum
Chicken game, new solution(s) arise for two identified sets of quantum mechanical joint probabil-
ities that maximally violate the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) sum of correlations [46].
The classical game of PD has a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) consisting of a pair of identical
pure strategies—and, in the two-player case, its quantum version in the scheme using the EPR-
Bohm setting, it does not generate a new outcome. This motivates us, in the present paper, to
study a quantum version of a two-player game, within the same scheme, that has a unique mixed
NE. The well-known game of Matching Pennies (MP) [1, 2] provides such an example.
Using the scheme based on EPR-Bohm experiments to play this game, we find the impact on
the solution of this game when the factorizability condition on joint probabilities is dropped, while
the conditions describing normalization and locality are retained.
Another motive behind investigating the MP game, played using the EPR-Bohm setting, is
as follows. We notice that when multiple NE emerge in a classical game, the analysis of its
quantum version generates a separate set of constraints on joint probabilities corresponding to
that particular NE. These constraints ensure that the classical game and its particular outcome
remains embedded within the quantum game. As the MP game has a unique mixed classical
NE, it presents an ideal situation to study how dropping the factorizability condition on joint
probabilities may change the outcome of the game.
2 Matching Pennies game
In the game of MP each of the two players, henceforth labelled as Alice and Bob, have a penny
that each secretly flips to heads H or tails T . No communication takes place between Bob and
Alice and they disclose their choices simultaneously to a referee, who organizes the game and
ensures that its rules are respected by the participating players.
If the referee finds that the pennies match (both heads or both tails), he takes one dollar from
Bob and gives it to Alice (+1 for Alice, −1 for Bob). If the pennies do not match (one heads
and one tails), the referee takes one dollar from Alice and gives it to Bob (−1 for Alice, +1 for
Bob). As one player’s gain is exactly equal to the other player’s loss, the game is zero-sum and is
represented with the payoff matrix:
Alice
H
T
Bob
H T(
(a1, b1) (a2, b2)
(a3, b3) (a4, b4)
)
, (1)
where we take a1 = +1, b1 = −1; a2 = −1, b2 = +1; a3 = −1, b3 = +1; and a4 = +1, b4 = −1.
2.1 Nash equilibrium
It is well known that MP has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium [2] and instead has a unique
mixed strategy NE. For completeness of this paper we describe here how this is found. Consider
repeated play of the game in which x and y are the probabilities with which H is played by Alice
and Bob, respectively. The pure strategy T is then played with probability (1− x) by Alice, and
with probability (1− y) by Bob, and the players’ payoff relations read
ΠA,B(x, y) =
(
x
1− x
)T (
(a1, b1) (a2, b2)
(a3, b3) (a4, b4)
)(
y
1− y
)
. (2)
A strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) is a NE when
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) ≥ 0, ΠB(x⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) ≥ 0. (3)
For the matrix (1) these inequalities read 2(x⋆ − x)(2y⋆ − 1) ≥ 0 and 2(y⋆ − y)(−2x⋆ + 1) ≥ 0
and generate the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) = (1/2, 1/2) as the unique NE of the game. At this NE
the players’ payoffs work out as
ΠA(1/2, 1/2) = 0 = ΠB(1/2, 1/2). (4)
2.2 Playing the game with 4 biased coins
The first step in our quantization scheme for the MP game consists of translating the game into a
classical arrangement using a physical system that involves 16 joint probabilities. The arrangement
we use consists of two players sharing 4 biased coins to play the game, assuming that the referee
has the means to set constraints on their biases.
The referee has 4 coins and s/he marks them as S1, S2, S
′
1, S
′
2. S/he identifies S1, S2 to be
Alice’s coins and S′1, S
′
2 to be Bob’s coins. In a run, the referee hands over the S1, S2 coins to
Alice and the S′1, S
′
2 coins Bob. Alice’s and Bob’s strategies consist of choosing one coin out of
the two that each player receives in a run. The pair of chosen coins in a run is one of the (S1, S
′
1),
(S1, S
′
2), (S2, S
′
1), (S2, S
′
2). The players return the two chosen coins to the referee who tosses them
together and records the outcome. The referee collects the 4 coins (2 tossed and 2 untossed) and
repeats the same procedure over a large number of runs.
Referee defines and makes public the players’ payoff relations that depend on a) the outcomes
of a large number of tosses of 4 biased coins, while 2 coins are tossed in each run b) the players’
strategies and c) the real numbers defining the matrix of the game.
We now state that the statistical behavior of the 4 biased coins, expressed over a large number
of tosses, is described by:
Alice
S1
+1
−1
S2
+1
−1
Bob
S′1
+1 −1
S′2
+1 −1

p1 p2
p3 p4
p5 p6
p7 p8
p9 p10
p11 p12
p13 p14
p15 p16

, (5)
where the H state of a coin is denoted by +1 and the T state by −1. The joint probabilities are
factorizable for coins, that is, one can find 4 numbers r, s, r′ and s′ ∈ [0, 1] from which the joint
probabilities can be obtained as
p1 = rr
′, p2 = r(1 − r′), p3 = r′(1 − r), p4 = (1− r)(1 − r′),
p5 = rs
′, p6 = r(1 − s′), p7 = s′(1 − r), p8 = (1− r)(1 − s′),
p9 = sr
′, p10 = s(1− r′), p11 = r′(1 − s), p12 = (1− s)(1− r′),
p13 = ss
′, p14 = s(1− s′), p15 = s′(1− s), p16 = (1− s)(1− s′),
(6)
where r and s are the probabilities of obtaining head for Alice’s coins S1 and S2, respectively and,
similarly, r′ and s′ are the probabilities of obtaining head for Bob’s coins S′1 and S
′
2, respectively.
In the following, we call r, s, r′, s′ the coin probabilities.
2.2.1 Payoff relations and Nash equilibrium
The referee makes public and uses the following payoff relations:
ΠA,B(x, y) =
(
x
1− x
)T (
ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1) ΠA,B(S1, S
′
2)
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
1) ΠA,B(S2, S
′
2)
)(
y
1− y
)
, (7)
where T is for transpose and x and y are the probabilities, definable over a large number of runs,
with which Alice and Bob choose S1 and S
′
1, respectively. Also, that the referee defines
ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1) =
∑4
i=1(a, b)ipi, ΠA,B(S1, S
′
2) =
∑8
i=5(a, b)i−4pi,
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
1) =
∑12
i=9(a, b)i−8pi, ΠA,B(S2, S
′
2) =
∑16
i=13(a, b)i−12pi. (8)
It can be shown how, and under what circumstances, the payoff relations (7) produce the
classical mixed-strategy game and result in the classical NE. For the factorizable joint probabilities
(6), obtained by a large number of coin tosses, the NE inequalities (3) read
4(r − s) {y⋆(r′ − s′) + s′ − 1/2} (x⋆ − x) ≥ 0,
−4(r′ − s′) {x⋆(r − s) + s− 1/2} (y⋆ − y) ≥ 0. (9)
At this stage, the referee sets the coin probabilities r, s, r′, s′ to be constrained as
r + s = 1, r′ + s′ = 1, (10)
which, of course, then results in the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) = (1/2, 1/2) to be the NE.
To obtain the players’ payoffs at this NE, from Eqs. (7,10) we evaluate following quantities
ΠA(S1, S
′
1) = (2r − 1)(2r′ − 1), ΠA(S1, S′2) = (2r − 1)(2s′ − 1),
ΠA(S2, S
′
1) = (2s− 1)(2r′ − 1), ΠA(S2, S′2) = (2s− 1)(2s′ − 1), (11)
from which the players’ rewards at the NE of (x⋆, y⋆) = (1/2, 1/2) are obtained as
ΠA(1/2, 1/2) = 0 = ΠB(1/2, 1/2). (12)
We have thus translated the playing of MP game in an arrangement involving 16 factorizable
joint probabilities, obtained from a large number of tosses performed on 4 biased coins. We
have found that, in order to guarantee that factorizable joint probabilities result in the classical
game, certain constraints, given in (10), need to be placed on the coin probabilities r, s, r′, s′.
This translation paves the way for introducing the quantum mechanical joint probabilities in the
playing of this game, that may not be factorizable as they are for classical coins.
3 Quantum games using the EPR-Bohm setting
We consider a quantum version of this game that is played using the EPR-Bohm setting. This
scheme for playing a quantum version of a two-player two-strategy game was originally developed
in Ref. [37]. The quantum game using the EPR-Bohm setting involves (refer to Fig. 1):
a) A large number of runs when, in a run, two halves of an EPR pair originate from the same
source and move in opposite directions.
b) One half is received by player Alice, while Bob receives the other half. Alice and Bob are
located at some distance from each other and are unable to communicate between themselves.
c) The players, however, can communicate about their actions, which they perform on their
received halves, to the referee who organizes the game and ensures that the rules of the game
are followed.
d) The referee [55] makes available two directions to each player. Call Alice’s two directions S1
and S2 and Bob’s two directions S
′
1 and S
′
2.
e) In a run, each player has to choose one of two directions at his/her disposal and informs the
referee of this choice.
f) After receiving information about the pair of directions, which the players have chosen
in a particular run, the referee rotates Stern-Gerlach type detectors along the two chosen
directions and performs a quantum measurement.
g) The outcome of the quantum measurement [56], on Alice’s side, and on Bob’s side of the
Stern-Gerlach detectors, is either +1 or −1.
h) Runs are repeated as the players receive a large number of halves in pairs, when each pair
comes from the same source.
i) The referee records the measurement outcomes for all runs, when in each run each player
chooses one of the two directions.
j) The referee defines a player’s strategy, over a large number of runs, to be a linear combination
(with normalized and real coefficients) of the two directions along which the measurement
is performed.
k) The referee has payoff relations that s/he makes public at the start of the game and an-
nounces rewards to the players after the completion of runs.
l) The referee constructs these payoff relations in view of a) the matrix (1) of the game being
played, b) the list of players’ choices of directions over several runs, and c) the list of
measurement outcomes that the referee prepares using his/her Stern-Gerlach apparatus.
Figure 1: S1 and S2 are the two directions that the referee assigns at the start of the game to Alice
and, in each run, Alice has to choose one direction. Over a large number of runs, Alice chooses S1
and S2 with probabilities x and (1− x), respectively. Similarly, the referee assigns two directions
S′1 and S
′
2 to Bob at the start of the game and, in each run, he has to choose one direction. Over
a large number of runs, Bob chooses S′1 and S
′
2 with the probabilities y and (1− y), respectively.
The translated MP game, using 4 biased coins, allows one to express players’ payoff relations
in terms of the 16 joint probabilities. The following Section shows that the physical system in
the EPR-Bohm experiments also involve 16 joint probabilities, and thus the above translation
provides the natural route for playing a quantum MP game.
3.1 Constraints on quantum mechanical joint probabilities
The payoff relations (7) are defined in view of the fact that the set of 16 joint probabilities satisfy
a number of constraints that are imposed by the requirements of a) normalization, b) locality, and
c) factorizability.
In order to better appreciate the quantum mechanical probabilities, we consider, for example,
the situation when over all runs Alice chooses S1 and Bob chooses S
′
2. Referee rotates Stern-
Gerlach detectors along these two directions and then, for example, referring to (5) p7 gives the
probability of him/her obtaining −1 along Alice’s S1 direction and +1 along Bob’s S′2 direction.
3.1.1 Normalization
Normalization says that when, for example, Alice chooses S1 and Bob chooses S
′
2 for all the runs,
the only possible outcomes are (+1,+1), (+1,−1), (−1,+1), (−1,−1). The same is true for other
pure strategy pairs (S1, S
′
1), (S2, S
′
1), (S2, S
′
2):
∑4
i=1 pi = 1 =
∑8
i=5 pi,
∑12
i=9 pi = 1 =
∑16
i=13 pi. (13)
3.1.2 Locality
The 16 joint probabilities satisfy another set of constraints that are obtained from the requirements
stating that in a run:
a) Alice’s outcome of +1 or −1 (obtained along S1 or S2) is independent of whether Bob
chooses S′1 or S
′
2 in that run
b) Bob’s outcome of +1 or −1 (obtained along S′1 or S′2) is independent of whether Alice
chooses S1 or S2 in that run.
When translated in terms of joint probabilities, and referring to (5), these requirements state
that
p1 + p2 = p5 + p6, p1 + p3 = p9 + p11, p9 + p10 = p13 + p14, p5 + p7 = p13 + p15,
p3 + p4 = p7 + p8, p11 + p12 = p15 + p16, p2 + p4 = p10 + p12, p6 + p8 = p14 + p16.
(14)
Quite often one finds in the literature the word ‘locality’ to describe these constraints. As can
be seen, the possibility, described in (6), of writing pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 16 in terms of r, s, r′, s′ ∈ [0, 1]
also assumes locality. Notice that for a factorizable set of joint probabilities (6) the locality
constraints (14) always hold.
3.1.3 Factorizability
Eqs. (6) state that the joint probabilities can be written in terms of r, s, r′, s′ ∈ [0, 1]. If this is
the case then
r = p1 + p2, s = p9 + p10, r
′ = p1 + p3, s
′ = p5 + p7, (15)
and the Eqs. (6) can be restated as
p1 = (p1 + p2)(p1 + p3), p2 = (p1 + p2)(1− p1 − p3), ...
p16 = (1− p9 − p10)(1− p5 − p7). (16)
The alert reader may notice that, in the writing of Eqs. (6,15) and in the possibility of find-
ing r, s, r′, s′ ∈ [0, 1] that allows this, it is assumed that joint probabilities satisfy the locality
constraints (14).
3.1.4 Cereceda’s analysis
We now refer to a result, reported by Cereceda [47] stating that, because of normalization (13),
half of the Eqs. (14) are redundant thus making eight among sixteen probabilities pi independent.
Cereceda has reported that a convenient solution of the system (13, 14), is the one for which the
set of variables:
υ = {p2, p3, p6, p7, p10, p11, p13, p16} , (17)
is expressed in terms of the remaining set of variables:
µ = {p1, p4, p5, p8, p9, p12, p14, p15} , (18)
is given as
p2 = (1− p1 − p4 + p5 − p8 − p9 + p12 + p14 − p15)/2,
p3 = (1− p1 − p4 − p5 + p8 + p9 − p12 − p14 + p15)/2,
p6 = (1 + p1 − p4 − p5 − p8 − p9 + p12 + p14 − p15)/2,
p7 = (1− p1 + p4 − p5 − p8 + p9 − p12 − p14 + p15)/2,
p10 = (1− p1 + p4 + p5 − p8 − p9 − p12 + p14 − p15)/2,
p11 = (1 + p1 − p4 − p5 + p8 − p9 − p12 − p14 + p15)/2,
p13 = (1− p1 + p4 + p5 − p8 + p9 − p12 − p14 − p15)/2,
p16 = (1 + p1 − p4 − p5 + p8 − p9 + p12 − p14 − p15)/2.
(19)
These relationships arise because the quantum mechanical joint probabilities fulfill both the
normalization condition (13) as well as the locality constraints (14).
3.1.5 CHSH inequality
Notice that using (5) the correlation 〈S1S′1〉, for example, can be found as
〈S1S′1〉 = Pr(S1 = 1, S′1 = 1)− Pr(S1 = 1, S′1 = −1)
−Pr(S1 = −1, S′1 = +1) + Pr(S1 = −1, S′1 = −1)
= p1 − p2 − p3 + p4. (20)
The correlations 〈S1S′1〉, 〈S1S′2〉, 〈S2S′1〉, and 〈S2S′2〉 can similarly be worked out. The CHSH sum
of correlations is then defined as
∆ = 〈S1S′1〉+ 〈S1S′2〉+ 〈S2S′1〉 − 〈S2S′2〉 , (21)
and the CHSH inequality:
|∆| ≤ 2, (22)
which holds for any theory of local hidden variables.
Cereceda has reported [47] that there exist two sets of joint probabilities that maximally violate
the quantum prediction of the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne (CHSH) sum of correlations. The first
set is given as
pj = (2 +
√
2)/8 for all pj ∈ µ,
pk = (2−
√
2)/8 for all pk ∈ υ, (23)
whereas the second set is given as
pj = (2−
√
2)/8 for all pj ∈ µ,
pk = (2 +
√
2)/8 for all pk ∈ υ, (24)
where υ and µ are defined in (17,18). That is, these two sets provide the maximum absolute limit
of 2
√
2 for ∆QM .
3.1.6 Constraints imposed by Cirel’son limit
Now, alongside the constraints (27) there is another set of constraints on joint probabilities that
are imposed by the Cirel’son limit [48], saying that the quantum prediction of the CHSH sum of
correlations ∆, defined in (21), is bounded in absolute value by 2
√
2 i.e. |∆QM | ≤ 2
√
2. Taking
into account [47] the normalization condition (13), the quantity ∆ is then equivalently expressed
as
∆ = 2(p1 + p4 + p5 + p8 + p9 + p12 + p14 + p15 − 2). (25)
In the following, the EPR setting, introduced in this Section, is used to play the quantum version
of the Matching Pennies game.
4 Quantum Matching Pennies game
Essentially, our quantum MP game corresponds when the 16 joint probabilities, that appear in the
payoff relations (7), are obtained using the EPR-Bohm setting, instead of using a large number of
tosses performed on biased coins.
The players’ payoff relations in the quantum MP game, therefore, remain exactly the same
as they are defined and made public by the referee in Eq. (7) for the translated game that uses
factorizable joint probabilities. Players’ strategies also remain exactly the same as they are in the
classical game.
The referee is free to prepare any quantum pure or mixed bi-partite state and to forward it
to the players. S/he also fixes the 4 available directions at the start of the game (refer to Fig. 1)
that cannot be changed as the game progresses and large number of its runs are carried out. A
player’s strategic choices do not go beyond choosing between the two assigned directions.
4.1 Embedding the classical game within the quantum game
Referring to Eq. (10) we recall that it expresses the constraints on the coin probabilities. We
also notice that the factorizability, expressed by (6), permits one to write the coin probabilities in
terms of joint probabilities:
r = p1 + p2, s = p9 + p10, r
′ = p1 + p3, s
′ = p5 + p7, (26)
which allows us to rewrite the constraints (10) on coin probabilities as
p1 + p3 + p5 + p7 = 1, p1 + p2 + p9 + p10 = 1. (27)
This provides the the key for embedding the classical game within the quantum game. S/he makes
prior (experimental) arrangements in the EPR-Bohm setup ensuring that the constraints (27) on
joint probabilities hold during the whole course of playing the game [57]. When this is the case the
classical game remains embedded within the corresponding quantum game in that the quantum
game attains classical interpretation with the joint probabilities becoming factorizable.
However, the joint probabilities that the EPR-Bohm setting can generate can also be non-
factorizable. This permits playing a quantum game in which the constraints (27) hold, while the
factorizability condition on joint probabilities is dropped.
We now look at how dropping the factorizability condition for joint probabilities affects the
outcome of the game. With the constraints (27) continuing to hold, the referee can then find a
pair of NE strategies (x⋆, y⋆) in the quantum game using the inequalities (3) as usual. Because of
non-factorizable joint probabilities the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) may be different from the one which
comes out for factorizable joint probabilities.
Notice that the rewards at the NE are identical to the ones given in (4). That is, when the 16
joint probabilities become factorizable, the NE and the players’ payoffs become identical to the
ones obtained in the usual mixed strategy solution of the MP game. Also, the 16 joint probabilities,
even when they are non-factorizable and, therefore, violate one or more of the set of Eqs. (16),
will always satisfy the normalization constraints (13) as well as the locality constraints (14).
To be consistent with the standard setting [2] for playing a two-player two-strategy game, the
referee considers it reasonable to require that in the EPR setting a player plays a pure strategy if
s/he chooses the same direction over all the runs and that s/he plays a mixed strategy if s/he has
a probability distribution with which s/he chooses between the two directions at her/his disposal.
However, identifying pure and mixed strategies in such a way is not of much help as the payoff
relations, which referee uses to reward the players, generate the classical mixed strategy game
even when the players play ‘pure strategies.’ This, however, remains consistent with the known
result in the area of quantum games stating that a pure product initial state leads to the classical
mixed strategy game.
4.2 Nash equilibria in the quantum game
We now find the NE that comes out from a set of non-factorizable (and thus quantum mechanical)
joint probabilities when the players’ payoff relations in the quantum game are obtained from the
Eq. (7). For the inequalities defining the NE in the quantum game we obtain
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = [y⋆ {ΠA(S1, S′1)−ΠA(S2, S′1)−ΠA(S1, S′2) + ΠA(S2, S′2)}
+ {ΠA(S1, S′2)−ΠA(S2, S′2)}](x⋆ − x) ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = [x⋆ {ΠB(S1, S′1)−ΠB(S1, S′2)−ΠB(S2, S′1) + ΠB(S2, S′2)}
+ {ΠB(S2, S′1)−ΠB(S2, S′2)}](y⋆ − y) ≥ 0, (28)
where Eqs. (8) and the matrix (1) gives
ΠA(S1, S
′
1) = p1 − p2 − p3 + p4 = −ΠB(S1, S′1),
ΠA(S1, S
′
2) = p5 − p6 − p7 + p8 = −ΠB(S1, S′2),
ΠA(S2, S
′
1) = p9 − p10 − p11 + p12 = −ΠB(S2, S′1),
ΠA(S2, S
′
2) = p13 − p14 − p15 + p16 = −ΠB(S2, S′2), (29)
where the right sides of these equations express the fact that the quantum game is a zero-sum
game as is the classical game.
Using Eqs. (19) we eliminate the 8 probabilities from the inequalities (28) that gives the
inequalities for the NE in the quantum game in terms of the probabilities appearing in the set
(18):
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = 2[y⋆ {(1 + p1 + p4)− (p5 + p8 + p9 + p12 + p14 + p15)}
+(p5 + p8 + p14 + p15 − 1)](x⋆ − x) ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = −2[x⋆ {(1 + p1 + p4)− (p5 + p8 + p9 + p12 + p14 + p15)}
+(p9 + p12 + p14 + p15 − 1)](y⋆ − y) ≥ 0. (30)
As some of the joint probabilities are constrained by (27), using (19) we rewrite these con-
straints as
p9 + p15 = p12 + p14, p5 + p14 = p8 + p15. (31)
Now, adding the two equations in (31) and subtracting the second from the first gives
p5 + p9 = p8 + p12, p5 + p12 + 2p14 = p8 + p9 + 2p15, (32)
and we write
p12 = p5 + p9 − p8 and p15 = p5 + p14 − p8, (33)
in order to eliminate arbitrarily the probabilities p12 and p15 from the inequalities (30) to obtain
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = 2[y⋆ {(1 + p1 + p4 + p8)− (3p5 + 2p9 + 2p14)}
+ {2(p5 + p14)− 1}](x⋆ − x) ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = −2[x⋆ {(1 + p1 + p4 + p8)− (3p5 + 2p9 + 2p14)}
+ {2(p5 − p8 + p9 + p14)− 1}](y⋆ − y) ≥ 0. (34)
The right sides of these inequalities involve six joint probabilities, which we treat as ‘indepen-
dent’ and these are p1, p4, p5, p8, p9, p14. These inequalities guarantee that for a factorizable set of
joint probabilities the classical mixed strategy game of MP emerges.
4.2.1 Nash equilibria for maximally entangled state
Refer to the probability sets (23,24) that maximally violate the CHSH inequality. Probabilities in
these sets are non-factorizable as for both sets a solution for r, s, r′, s′ obtained from the Eqs. (6)
makes one or more of the probabilities r, s, r′, s′ to be negative or greater than one. This is also
equivalent to stating that for either of the sets (23,24) one or more of the equations (16) does not
hold, when r, s, r′, s′ ∈ [0, 1] and the constraints (14) imposed by locality hold.
Now a natural question arising here is to ask if these two probability sets can be used for the
quantum game of MP. This will indeed be possible if for each of these two sets the constraints
given by (27) hold ensuring that the classical MP game is embedded within the quantum. For
both the sets (23,24) we find that the constraint (27) hold, thus these probability sets, maximally
violating the CHSH sum of correlations, can legitimately be used in the quantum MP game.
For the first set (23) the inequalities (34) work out as
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) =
√
2(−y⋆ + 1)(x⋆ − x) ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = −
√
2(−x⋆ + 1)(y⋆ − y) ≥ 0, (35)
which give the strategy pairs (1, 0) and (1, 1) as NE. At the strategy pair (1, 0) the players’ payoffs
are obtained from Eqs. (7,29) as ΠA(1, 0) = 1/
√
2 = −ΠB(1, 0) whereas at the strategy pair (1, 0)
the players’ payoffs are obtained to be the same i.e. ΠA(1, 1) = 1/
√
2 = −ΠB(1, 1).
Similarly, for the second set (24) the NE inequalities (34) are
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) =
√
2(y⋆ − 1)(x⋆ − x) ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = −
√
2(x⋆ − 1)(y⋆ − y) ≥ 0, (36)
giving the strategy pairs (0, 1) and (1, 1) as the NE. At the strategy pair (0, 1) the players’ payoffs
work out as ΠA(0, 1) = −1/
√
2 = −ΠB(0, 1) whereas at the strategy pair (1, 1) the players’ payoffs
are obtained as the same i.e. ΠA(1, 1) = −1/
√
2 = −ΠB(1, 1).
5 Discussion
This paper is motivated by the observation that by having a unique mixed NE the classical MP
game offers an opportunity for seeing more clearly how dropping the factorizability condition on
joint probabilities may affect this unique NE, which emerges for factorizable joint probabilities in
the quantization scheme based on EPR-Bohm experiments.
Notice that in the scheme based on EPR-Bohm experiments the referee’s role is significantly
increased as compared to other schemes for playing quantum games. This is because s/he is free to
provide any pair of directions to each player and makes quantum measurement(s) on any pure or
mixed bi-partite states. The available options for the players are, therefore, reduced in comparison
to what is the case in other quantization schemes [11,15], and they have exactly the same options
as in the classical game. In a classical two-player two-strategy game each player can play a linear
combination (with real and normalized coefficients) of two pure strategies and this remains exactly
the same in the our scheme for playing a two-player quantum game.
Joint probabilities in EPR-Bohm experiments, performed on entangled bipartite states, are
known to become non-factorizable when players make their strategic choices along certain pairs of
directions. This provides the opportunity to look at the possible new outcomes of the game that
non-factorizable joint probabilities may generate. In the quantization scheme based on EPR-Bohm
experiments the constraints placed on probabilities guarantee that the classical game remains
embedded within the quantum game, while probabilities may become non-factorizable.
By constructing quantum games directly from quantum probabilities the suggested approach
contributes towards an understanding and potential use of quantum probabilities in the area of
game theory. That is, the question addressed in this paper asks whether quantum probabilities
have more to offer to game theory. The answer to this we find is ‘yes’.
The possibility that CHSH inequality can be rephrased in terms of two-player cooperative
games has been reported in literature. In Ref. [51] Cleve et al. have reported a game based on
CHSH inequality in which the maximum probability of winning the classical game is 3/4 whereas,
using a quantum strategy, the players can win this game with probability 0.85, which, as they
show using Cirel’son’s limit, is optimal. Also, in Ref. [52] Cheon has reported a quantum game
in which both players maximize a quantity (utility) defined from spin projections of two particles
which they share, whereas the payoff operators are the measurement operator for EPR-Bohm
experiment. Cheon then finds the NE of the quantum game that rewards the players far better
for particles with maximum entanglement compared to when the particles are uncorrelated.
Both of these studies show that EPR-Bohm experiments can be translated into special games.
The contribution of the quantization scheme developed in Ref. [37], and that of the present paper,
however, is that it shows that, along with the reported possibility of translating EPR-Bohm
experiments as special games, one can in fact quantize any two-player game using the framework
of EPR-Bohm experiments. Secondly, that we can analyze our quantum game using the non-
factorizable property of quantum mechanical joint probabilities.
Nonfactorizability is known [49, 50, 53] to be a necessary but insufficient condition for the
violation of Bell’s inequality, the CHSH form of which we consider here. That is, a set of 16 joint
probabilities that violates Bell’s inequality will always be non-factorizable, whereas one can find a
set of joint probabilities that is non-factorizable and still does not violate the CHSH form of Bell’s
inequality. This known result has the following implications when it is considered in our scheme
for playing quantum games using EPR-Bohm experiments: As a new solution of the game, which
emerges because of dropping the factorizability condition, the relevant joint probabilities may not
violate the Bell’s inequality (in its CHSH form)—only those outcomes of the quantum game are
to be considered to have a bona fide quantum aspect [30] for which the corresponding set of joint
probabilities violates the CHSH form of Bell’s inequality. The NE of the quantum game for which
the Bell’s inequality is not violated will, therefore, have a pseudoclassical aspect.
Using Bell’s inequality one can identify the pseudoclassical domain from the quantum domain
as follows. With the constraints (27) the CHSH inequality (22) using (25, 33) reduces itself to
|∆r| ≤ 1 where ∆r = (p1 + p4 + 3p5 − p8 + 2p9 + 2p14 − 2). Now, if a set of joint probabilities
results in a NE in the quantum game and for this set we have |∆r| ≤ 1 then this NE has the
pseudoclassical aspect. However, if for this set we have |∆r| > 1 then it has a bona fide quantum
aspect. Note that in the quantum MP game the strategy pairs (1, 0) and (1, 1) emerge as NE for
the set (23). For these NE we obtain ∆r = 2
√
2. Similarly, the strategy pairs (0, 1) and (1, 1)
emerge as NE for the set (23) and for these NE we obtain ∆r = −2
√
2. These four NE, therefore,
have a bona fide quantum aspect.
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